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Abstract 
Building on recent contributions to the New Economic Geography literature, this paper 
analyses the relation between asymmetric market size, trade integration and corporate income 
tax differentials across countries. First, relying on Ottaviano and Van Ypersele’s (2005) foot-
loose capital model of tax competition, we illustrate that trade integration reduces the 
importance of relative market size for differences in the extent of corporate taxation between 
countries. Then, using a dataset of 26 OECD countries over the period 1982-2004, we provide 
supportive evidence of these theoretical predictions: i.e., market size differences are strongly 
positively correlated with corporate income tax differences across countries but, crucially, 
trade integration weakens this link. These findings are obtained controlling for the potential 
endogeneity of trade integration and are robust to alternative specifications. 
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“You’ve had a broad substantial reduction in corporate tax rates outside 
the US. That occurs at a time when it’s much easier (...) for companies 
to shift investment and income to take advantage of lower tax rates 
overseas. (...) To have a more competitive system, you want to try to 
bring down the rate closer to the range of our major trading partners.” 
(Timothy Geithner, former US Treasury Secretary,  
Wall Street Journal, 28-30 January 2011, 9) 
 
1. Introduction 
Looking at the evolution of corporate tax rates in developed countries over the last three 
decades, two observations stand out. The first is a decline in corporate tax rates (Figure 1, left-
hand side). For example, between 1982 and 2011 OECD countries on average reduced their 
statutory and effective average corporate income tax rates by, respectively, 45 percent (from 
an average of 47% to an average of 26%) and 38 percent (from an average of 37% to an 
average of 23%).1 The highest statutory corporate tax rate within the OECD stood at 65% 
(Israel) in 1982, and 41% (Japan) in 2011. The second is the presence of important corporate 
tax disparities across countries despite this downward trend. Indeed, while the standard 
deviation of the distribution of effective marginal, effective average, and statutory tax rates 
across OECD countries fell substantially between 1982 and 2000, this decline bottomed out 
since then, even though significant variation remains (Figure 1, right-hand side).  
 
--- Figure 1 about here --- 
 
Recent studies indicate the importance of such tax differences for firm location or FDI 
flows (Bénassy-Quéré et al., 2005; Kammas, 2011; Brülhart et al., 2012). Empirical analyses 
aimed at understanding what allows some countries to sustain higher tax rates than others 
have, however, not followed suit.2 Yet, such insights can have important policy implications. 
1  This decline is also present when looking only at countries that were OECD members throughout the 1982-
2011 period. 
2  While numerous studies analyse the decline in corporate tax rates (Devereux et al., 2002, 2008; Davies and 
Voget, 2008), Gilbert et al. (2005) is the only study analysing the determinants of corporate tax rate 
differentials. Compared to that study, we provide a firmer theoretical rationale for the analysis, address 
potential endogeneity problems, control for the influence of various country-level variables, and employ a 
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Former US Treasury Secretary Geithner’s statement quoted above indeed makes clear that a 
central reason behind the US’ planned overhaul of the corporate tax system lies in fears that 
increasing economic integration is undermining the US’ ability to sustain higher tax rates 
compared to its main trading partners.3 
This article analyses the determinants of corporate tax differentials across countries, 
focusing on the role of trade integration. From a theoretical perspective, we exploit insights 
from the tax competition literature based on New Economic Geography (NEG) frameworks. 
While it has long been known that larger countries can sustain higher corporate taxes (a 
finding that goes back, at least, to Wilson, 1991; Bucovetsky, 1991), recent contributions to 
the NEG literature predict that bigger countries lose this advantage with increasing trade 
integration (or falling trade costs) because the site of production then becomes less relevant 
(Ottaviano and van Ypersele, 2005; Gaigné and Riou, 2007; Haufler and Wooton, 2010). 
Consequently, the NEG literature predicts that tax disparities across countries reflect the fact 
that some countries are exposed to tax competition to a different degree than others, 
depending on the level of trade costs and their relative market size. This paper’s central 
contribution lies in assessing such claim’s empirical relevance.  
Our analysis proceeds in two stages. First, we build on the foot-loose capital model of 
Ottaviano and Van Ypersele (2005) to derive two empirically testable predictions: a) tax 
differentials are a function of the coexistence of imperfect trade integration and asymmetric 
market sizes and b) increased trade integration reduces the ability of large countries to set 
higher taxes. Second, we evaluate these predictions employing data for 26 OECD countries 
(thus generating up to 325 country-pairs) over the period 1982-2004. Unlike existing 
wider sample of countries (i.e., 26 OECD countries versus 15 European countries). 
3  Although we focus on international tax competition, countries often use a variety of measures to increase their 
appeal for international firms. Pieretti and Zanaj (2011), for example, analyse the case where jurisdictions 
compete for foreign capital via both taxes and public inputs that enhance firms’ productivity while Charlton 
(2003) looks at investment subsidies. Also, some countries give preferential treatment to highly mobile tax 
bases (e.g., Ireland taxes manufacturing and financial services less than other sectors). We abstract from such 
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empirical tax competition studies – which mostly estimate tax reaction functions, where the 
tax rate in one country is linked to a population- or distance-weighted average of competing 
countries’ tax rates (Devereux et al., 2002, 2008; Davies and Voget, 2008) – we thereby 
explicitly model the tax rate difference between each country-pair. The reason is threefold. 
First, the focus of reaction function analyses lies on absolute levels of taxation. This can be 
misleading, since what matters for firms’ location choices – and thus for tax competition – is 
the difference in corporate tax rates between countries rather than the absolute level of 
taxation in each country (see also Bénassy-Quéré et al., 2005). Moreover, tax differentials 
more directly capture the idea that investors arbitrate not only among foreign locations, but 
also between each foreign location and domestic investment. Finally, while estimation of tax 
reaction functions allows analysing the decline in corporate taxes rates, it does not provide 
direct insights regarding the determinants of tax differentials, which is our central concern. 
Our results support theoretical predictions from Ottaviano and Van Ypersele (2005) and 
Haufler and Wooton (2010). Specifically, we show that the tax gap responds positively to 
population size (and GDP) differences between countries and, crucially, that this relationship 
is significantly attenuated by trade integration. Our analysis thereby controls for the 
endogeneity of standard measures of trade integration by extracting the level of trade 
liberalisation between each country-pair from a gravity equation (Rose and Van Wincoop, 
2001; Feenstra, 2003; Redding and Venables, 2004; Head and Mayer, 2011). This constitutes 
strong evidence since the relatively highly-integrated nature of OECD countries’ economies 
provides an environment least likely to expose substantial effects.  
In the following section, we formulate our main hypothesis on the determinants of 
international corporate income tax differentials. The empirical verification thereof is 
described in section 3. The last section concludes and discusses some avenues for further 
cross-sectoral discrimination (for recent treatments, see Wilson, 2005; Marceau et al., 2010). 
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research. 
 
2. Related literature and testable hypothesis 
The first theoretical explanation for cross-country corporate income tax differentials goes 
back to Bucovetsky (1991) and Wilson (1991). They develop a tax competition model 
composed of two perfectly integrated and competitive economies that differ only in terms of 
their population size. Because capital demand mostly emanates from the larger country, a 
variation in its tax rate exerts a stronger impact on the return to capital so that the cost of 
capital is less responsive to tax policy. Consequently, the larger country sets a higher tax rate 
and the smaller country is a net-importer of capital. This path-breaking insight was recently 
revisited by analyses using a New Economic Geography (NEG) framework (Ludema and 
Wooton, 2000; Andersson and Forslid, 2003; Baldwin and Krugman, 2004). They deviate 
from the basic tax competition model by assuming increasing returns to scale and positive 
trade costs in order to provide structural determinants to the location of capital and the tax 
base elasticity (Baldwin et al., 2003). We build on the latter literature – and most explicitly 
the foot-loose capital model of tax competition developed by Ottaviano and Van Ypersele 
(2005) (hereafter, OvY)4 – to derive our key hypothesis. While we describe the key 
assumptions and results below, technical details are provided in Exbrayat and Geys (2012). 
In the OvY model, the economy consists of two imperfectly integrated countries, which 
compete to attract monopolistic firms. These firms produce horizontally differentiated 
varieties of a good (say, x) under increasing returns to scale. Producing any variety requires a 
fixed amount of capital (normalised to one) and exporting any variety between countries 
4 This choice is driven by two main reasons. Firstly, by assuming mobile physical capital and immobile labour, 
the model is well-designed to explore corporate income tax differentials between countries. Assuming human 
capital mobility (as in, for instance, Ludema and Wooton, 2000; Andersson and Forslid, 2003; Baldwin and 
Krugman, 2004) would indeed be more relevant for studies of tax competition on a smaller spatial scale, such 
as within a federal country. Second, the main predictions of the OvY model are robust to various alternative 
assumptions (see below). 
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involves a per-unit trade cost. Production also requires a variable amount of labor, which is 
normalized to zero without loss of generality. Another private good, the numéraire (z), is 
produced under perfect competition using only labour and is freely traded. Hence, there are 
two factors of production, physical capital and labour, whose total endowments are assumed 
to be fixed and equally distributed across individuals in either country. However, a higher 
share of the total population is assumed to live in one country. This is the only asymmetry 
introduced in the model as all consumers in both countries are also assumed to share the same 
quasi-linear utility function (which is quadratic in the horizontally differentiated varieties of 
good x and linear in the numéraire). All residents are immobile, but they can invest their 
capital in the country where industrial firms are most profitable.5 Finally, the public sector in 
each country is represented by a benevolent government, which imposes a lump-sum tax on 
capital invested in its country. If this tax is positive, the resulting tax revenues are 
redistributed in a lump-sum way to the workers (and vice versa). All in all, this model stays 
very close to the standard model of asymmetric tax competition (Bucovetsky, 1991; Wilson, 
1991) so that any differences in the predictions are only imputable to the assumption of 
increasing returns to scale and positive trade costs. Both assumptions imply that investment 
decisions become lumpy and are driven by the spatial return to capital across countries.  
Importantly, the spatial distribution of capital resulting from this set-up is characterized 
by the so-called ‘home-market effect’: i.e. the country with a larger demand for the increasing 
returns industry attracts more production relative to its population because firms save on trade 
costs by locating in this country. This result holds despite the fact that the larger country will 
set a higher capital tax in equilibrium, which marks a crucial difference with respect to the 
models of Bucovetsky (1991) and Wilson (1991). Moreover, this effect is strengthened by the 
level of trade liberalization. Particularly, there is a threshold level of trade costs under which 
5  Industrial firms enter and exit freely. Thus, the rental rate to capital is determined by a bidding process among 
firms which ends when after-tax profits are equal to zero. The location equilibrium of capital is then obtained 
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it becomes so cheap to serve the foreign market through exports that a core-periphery 
structure emerges, characterized by the complete concentration of firms in the larger country. 
Consequently, the tax base elasticity and the resulting tax equilibrium in the model will 
crucially depend on the level of trade liberalization.6 
Let us first consider the most realistic case of intermediate trade costs, which implies that 
there is only partial agglomeration in the larger country.7 In such setting, the equilibrium tax 
gap between the large and small country (see eq. 22 in OvY) can be rewritten as follows: 
                                         ( ) ( )( )( )cKb
cKbacKb
522
36
+
+−+
Ω=∆∗
ττ                                                (1) 
where τ stands for the per-unit level of trade cost, Ω is the difference in population between 
the big and the small country, K is the total stock of capital and a, b and c are positive 
parameters from the demand function.8 Equation (1) first of all indicates that the tax gap is 
increasing in the population difference, provided that trade costs are positive but not-
prohibitive ( ( ) ( )( ) ( ) 052236/ >++−+=Ω∆∗ cKbcKbacKbdd ττ ).9 The intuition is as 
follows. Firms generate higher profits by locating in the largest market (because they save 
trade costs), which lowers the tax base elasticity and allows the government in the larger 
country to set a higher capital tax. In contrast, the government of the less populated country 
must compensate its firms for their location disadvantage via a lower capital tax.10 Equation 
(1) furthermore shows that for non prohibitive trade costs, trade liberalization reduces the 
positive impact of the market size difference on the tax gap between both countries 
by equalizing the net-return to capital across countries. 
6 Precisely, the tax base elasticity is magnified by trade liberalization. 
7 We do not consider the case of prohibitive trade costs given that we test the model’s predictions on a sample of 
countries that de facto trade with each other (such that trade costs cannot be prohibitive in our dataset). 
8 Specifically, c≥0 is an inverse measure of the substitutability between varieties. It captures the effect of the 
price of variety j on the demand for another variety i (cross-price effect). Nevertheless, as all prices of all 
varieties are equal to p in equilibrium, the demand for each variety boils down to q=aK-bpK, where parameter 
b captures the own-price effect. 
9 In the OvY model, trade costs are non-prohibitive whenever τ<τtrade=2a/(2b+cK). We can easily check that (6a-
τ(3b+cK)>0 for all τ<τtrade. Thus, Δ* and dΔ*/dΩ are positive for non-prohibitive values of trade costs. 
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( ( ) ( )( ) ( ) 051233/2 >++−+=Ω∆∗ cKbcKbacKbddd ττ ).11  Indeed, the fall in trade costs 
reduces the difference in the net-return to capital between countries and thus limits the ability 
of the larger country to set higher taxes. It is also worth noting from equation (1) that the level 
of trade costs has no direct impact on the tax differential when countries are of equal size. 
Trade costs only matter through their influence on countries’ relative market size (though 
trade integration clearly has a direct impact on the absolute levels of taxation). 
Turning now to the case where trade costs are so low that complete agglomeration in the 
larger country occurs, and the tax base elasticity in that country equals zero. As there is no 
capital in the small country, the tax game will be such that the government of the larger 
country sets its tax rate at the highest level compatible with the government of the smaller 
country being unable to attract capital. The resulting tax differential is described in eq. 23 of 
OvY, and can be rewritten as follows:         
 ( )( )( )cKb
KLcbacKbCP
+
−Ω−
+=∆
24
24 τττ                (2) 
We can easily verify that this expression is positive for all values of trade costs compatible 
with a core-periphery equilibrium and zero in the absence of trade costs.12 More importantly, 
this tax gap shares the same two properties as the tax gap under the interior location 
equilibrium discussed above: i.e., it increases in the population difference between both 
countries for positive, but non-prohibitive, trade costs 
( ( )( ) ( ) 0222/ >++−=Ω∆ cKbcKbbadd CP ττ ), and this relation is weakened as trade costs 
10 Importantly, and contrary to standard tax competition models, this result is valid only for imperfectly 
integrated economies. Indeed, in the extreme case of a perfectly integrated economy (that is, τ=0), firms are 
indifferent between countries, so that both governments set equal tax rates. 
11 Note that (3a-τ(3b+cK))>0 for all τ<τtrade , so that d²Δ*/dΩdτ>0 for non-prohibitive values of trade costs. 
12 Indeed, (4a-2bτ)Ω-KLcτ is decreasing with the level of trade costs, and equal to zero at level of trade costs 
inducing a core-periphery structure (i.e. τcp=4aΩ/(2bΩ+cKL)). Thus, (4a-2bτ)Ω-KLcτ is positive for all levels 
of trade costs compatible with a core-periphery structure. 
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fall ( ( )( ) ( ) 02/2 >++−=Ω∆ cKbcKbbaddd CP ττ ).13 Thus, in the extreme case of a perfectly 
integrated economy (that is, τ=0), firms are indifferent between locating in the large or small 
country (so that both governments set equal tax rates). These properties of the equilibrium tax 
differentials lead us to formulate the following testable prediction:  
 
Hypothesis: Assume tax competition between two benevolent governments of differently 
populated countries. For positive but non-prohibitive values of trade costs, 
a) the tax gap between both countries is increasing with the difference in their populations 
b) this relationship is mitigated as trade costs fall. 
 
Before empirically testing this hypothesis, we should note that it is robust to various 
extensions. One can indeed show the above prediction continues to hold in a three-country 
version of the model, and is robust to alternative assumptions regarding (1) the government’s 
behaviour (e.g., the introduction of public good provision)14, (2) changes in the timing of 
events under the interior equilibria configuration (i.e., allowing the big country to act as 
Stackelberg leader in the tax game) and (3) allowing for Leviathan behaviour (technical 
details to all these extensions are available upon request). Finally, Haufler and Wooton (2010) 
derive the same prediction assuming oligopolistic rather than monopolistic competition. 
 
3.    Empirical Analysis 
3.1.   Model specification 
13 We can check that (ab-τ)>0 for all τ<τtrade. Thus, Ω∆ dd CP /  and τddd CP Ω∆ /2 are positive for non-prohibitive 
values of trade costs. Note also that the main difference under a core-periphery equilibrium is that trade costs 
exert a direct negative influence on the tax differential whereas they act only through the population 
differential at interior equilibria. 
14  In OvY model, governments are assumed to be engaged in a purely redistributive fiscal policy. 
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To test the above prediction, we exploit an unbalanced panel of 26 OECD countries over the 
period 1982-2004 (thus having maximally 325 country-pairs per period).15 Our baseline 
regression is: 
        ( ) ijttjiijtijtijtijtijtijt DOYPopGapPopGapTaxGap εηβϕββϕβ +++++×++= 4321  
where ij refers to a country-pair with i≠ j and t indexes time. Before discussing the 
operationalisation of the constituent parts of this model, two comments are required. First, one 
could argue that a natural alternative to this linear specification would start by taking the 
logarithm of eq. 1, and estimate a loglinear specification. Clearly, however, given the large 
number of negative values arising from the construction of both dependent and independent 
variables (i.e., as the difference between the values of countries i and j; see below), this is 
empirically unfeasible. Second, the explicit two-country set-up may be deemed problematic in 
a multi-country world. Still, we address the potential influence of ‘third countries’ in a 
number of ways throughout the analysis (see the end of this section, as well as section 3.4.3). 
This not only mitigates concerns about possible mis-specification bias, but also evaluates the 
robustness of our results to the exact operationalisation of such third-country effects.  
The dependent variable – i.e., the tax gap between a pair of countries (TaxGapijt) – is 
defined as the difference between the Effective Average Tax Rate (EATR) on firms in 
countries i and j at time t (Loretz, 2008). We thereby employ the EATR levied on machinery, 
as this is a mobile and tradable good (unlike buildings). Clearly, as the tax gap between 
countries i and j is the same as that between countries j and i, we only include each country-
15  The set of countries includes Australia, Austria, Canada, Switzerland, Germany, Denmark, Spain, Finland, 
France, Great-Britain, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Iceland, Japan, Korea, Mexico, the Netherlands, 
Norway, New-Zealand, Poland, Portugal, Sweden, Turkey and US. The starting point follows from the 
availability of corporate tax rate data (source: Loretz, 2008), while the endpoint is due to the lack of data 
allowing for the correction of the endogeneity of liberalisation after 2004 (source: CEPII-TradeProd and 
CEPII-Gravity databases; Head et al., 2010; de Sousa et al., 2012).  Although using trade flow data provided 
by, for instance, the IMF might have allowed us to slightly extend our time dimension, we prefer to rely on 
the CEPII-TradeProd dataset because it exploits mirror trade flows (i.e., it reports on both exporting and 
importing countries), which significantly improves both the coverage and accuracy of trade data (see Mayer 
et al., 2008). 
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pair once per year (and select those country-pairs ij where country i was alphabetically prior 
to country j). Note also that we employ EATR rather than the Effective Marginal Tax Rate 
(EMTR) or the statutory tax rate for two reasons. First, the statutory tax rate does not include 
tax base effects and firms are likely to decide their investment decisions based on what the 
entire tax schedule (i.e., tax base and tax rate) implies for them. Second, as the theoretical 
analysis is inspired by competition over ‘greenfield’ rather than additional investments,16 
EATR is the most appropriate measure. Nevertheless, for reasons of comparison and 
robustness, we run our estimations also with EMTR and the statutory tax rate (see below). 
There are two central explanatory variables. First, PopGapijt stands for the difference in 
population size between countries i and j at time t (in million people) and analyzes how the 
tax gap responds to population size differences between countries (part a) of OvY theoretical 
prediction). One could argue that this reliance on the population difference takes the 
theoretical model overly literal, and that the difference in GDP or market potential would be 
more appropriate (since Ω  effectively measures the relative size of the market). We prefer the 
population measure as employing GDP creates an obvious endogeneity problem. This is not 
the case for the population-based measure since corporate taxation arguably leaves 
individuals’ residence decisions – and thus the relative size of countries’ populations – 
unaffected. Moreover, the population difference provides a credible measure of the relative 
market size since it is significantly positively related to the GDP-difference (r=0.21; p<0.01) 
as well as the market potential difference (r=0.65; p<0.01; this variable is defined in more 
detail in section 3.2). Still, we also report results using the GDP difference (correcting for the 
endogeneity of GDP) and the difference in market potential. Second, to address part b) of our 
central theoretical prediction, we introduce the level of bilateral trade liberalisation (φijt) – 
which approximates the effect of trade costs deriving from various impediments to trade and 
16  What is taxed is the return to capital employed as a fixed cost in the modern industry, which is equal to firms’ 
operating profits. 
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corresponds to the general interpretation of trade costs in the theoretical model – and interact 
it with PopGapijt. Given the endogeneity of traditional trade openness measures (i.e., imports 
and exports as a share of GDP), our identification strategy here rests on estimating φijt from a 
gravity equation controlling for remoteness by the use of country fixed effects (Rose and Van 
Wincoop, 2001; Feenstra, 2003; Redding and Venables, 2004; for details, see section 3.3). 
Larger values of φijt indicate closer trade integration (and thus lower trade costs), implying a 
positive sign for β2 and a negative one for β3.  
We also include φijt independently. This not only avoids biased inferences on its 
interaction with the population differential, but also allows testing whether trade integration 
fails to have a direct impact on the tax differential – as predicted by eq. 1.17 Specifically, eq. 1 
indicates that the level of trade costs only matters through its influence on countries’ relative 
market size at interior equilibria, whereas it has a direct and negative influence on the tax gap 
at the core-periphery equilibrium. Consequently, a statistically insignificant coefficient β1 
would suggest that all governments consider the tax base elasticity to be positive, whereas a 
significant β1 rather indicates that one government in each country-pair behaves as if all 
industrial firms were located in its country and tax base elasticity equals zero. 
The vector Yijt represents a number of control variables that can be expected to affect tax 
rates, and therefore the tax gap between countries. Specifically, building on a large political 
economics literature, we include the difference in country-pairs’ real GDP (in million dollars), 
public consumption (i.e., public sector size as a share of GDP), urbanness (share of population 
in urban areas), share of young and old in the population (under 14 and over 65 respectively), 
unemployment rate, openness (imports plus exports as a share of GDP), capital mobility 
(measured on a 10-point scale, where increasing numbers indicate higher capital mobility, and 
taken from the Economic Freedom of the World database), political leaning of the 
17  Still, excluding φijt from the model does not affect our findings in any way. 
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government (1 if right-wing, 0 if centre and -1 if left-wing), and two dummy variables equal 
to 1 when one or both countries are part of the European Union or its precursors.18 Data 
definitions, summary statistics and sources are in appendix. 
Finally, Oi and Dj represent a vector of country of ‘origin’ (i.e., first in our country-pair) 
and ‘destination’ (i.e., second in our country-pair) indicator variables and ηt is a set of year 
dummies, which pick up country-specific and time-specific effects. Importantly, inclusion of 
these fixed effects goes some way towards mitigating the potential bias of not explicitly 
introducing third-country effects in the empirical model (as mentioned, however, we return to 
such effects in section 3.4.3).19 Note that we also experimented with country-pair fixed 
effects. As this alternative specification does not affect our main findings (details upon 
request), but more strongly reduces our degrees of freedom, we retain separate origin and 
destination fixed effects in the main analysis. 
 
3.2.    Measuring trade liberalization (and market potential) 
Following Head and Mayer (2011), we estimate bilateral trade relations from a gravity 
equation which takes the following simple multiplicative form:20 
jijiij FMFXX ××= ϕ  
with Xij the exports from country i to country j, φij the freeness of trade, and FXi and FMj as 
exporter and importer fixed effects. Formally, στϕ −= 1ijij , with ijτ  the bilateral iceberg costs 
and σ the elasticity of substitution between varieties. The exporter fixed effects typically 
capture the export capabilities of country i while the importer fixed effects capture demand 
18 Trade openness is used to control for the impact of multilateral – rather than bilateral – trade integration on tax 
differentials. As such, we evaluate the effect of bilateral trade integration, given the extent of multilateral trade 
integration. Note also that we chose to retain the difference in real GDP as a control variable, and will return to 
its likely endogenous nature below. Our results remain unchanged, however, when excluding either or both of 
these variables. 
19 We thank José de Sousa for fruitful comments and discussions on this point. 
20 We choose this model because a wide range of different micro-foundations yield such an equation (e.g., Dixit 
and Stiglitz, 1977; Eaton and Kortum, 2002; Anderson and van Wincoop, 2003; Melitz and Ottaviano, 2008). 
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from country j. Following the literature, we consider that trade freeness depends on several 
variables that either enhance or deter trade: bilateral distance (Distij), contiguity (Cij), common 
language (Lij) and colonial links (Colij). Such historical elements provide a critical source of 
exogenous variation. Taking logs, our gravity regression is specified as follows: 
              ijtijijijijjtitijt uColLCDistFMFXX ++++++= 321lnln λλλδ                      (3) 
Attempts to include time-varying trade policy variables – such as membership of regional 
trade agreements – proved unsuccessful (i.e., the model often fails to converge) as there is 
insufficient heterogeneity in our sample with respect to these variables.21  To nonetheless 
account for temporal influences, we estimate eq. (3) separately for each year. This allows 
trade costs to change for each country-pair in each year, and does so without imposing a 
predefined functional form on such changes – unlike, for instance, introducing dummy 
variables for regional trade agreements or the fall of the Berlin Wall. This flexibility is 
important to pick up trade cost changes when they de facto occur (not when we would de jure 
expect them), and allows the strength of such effects to develop over time (rather than 
imposing a constant effect). The resulting model – estimated using bilateral trade data over 
the period 1980-2004 with data for trade liberalisation (both provided by the CEPII-
TradeProd and CEPII-Gravity databases; Head et al., 2010; de Sousa et al., 2012) – provides 
a very good approximation of trade flows, with an average R2 of 98% (88% when looking 
exclusively at variation within country-pairs over time), and variables used as trade cost 
proxies are statistically significant well beyond the 99% confidence level. From this set of 
estimations, we extract predicted values for bilateral trade integration as follows (Head and 
Mayer, 2011):22 
21  Moreover, regional trade agreements may be endogeneous (Baier and Bergstrand, 2007). 
22 One can similarly extract a measure for a country’s overall market potential: i.e.,  
∑ 




=
∧∧
j
ijtjtit FMRmp ϕˆexp  (see Head and Mayer, 2011). We use this measure in the robustness check in 
section 3.4.4 below). 
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( )ijijijijijt ColLCDist 321ˆ ˆˆˆexpˆ λλλϕ δ ++=  
Summary statistics are provided in Appendix. These illustrate that the estimated trade 
integration measure varies substantially both across space and time, and displays an overall 
upward trend across the three decades covered in our sample period (i.e. more trade 
integration in later years). Moreover, though not reported in detail to preserve space, it picks 
up important shifts in trade integration among OECD countries: e.g., our measure records 
substantial increases immediately following the fall of the Berlin Wall, around the Austrian-
Finnish-Swedish EU-accession in 1995 and around the large-scale eastward EU enlargement 
in 2004, as well as a marked decline during the 1997-1998 global financial crises. 
While this estimation of φijt has a clear theoretical underpinning and addresses the 
endogeneity issue, extracting it from such first-stage regressions makes it a ‘generated 
regressor’. Fortunately, OLS leads to consistent coefficient estimates in the presence of 
generated regressors (Pagan, 1984). Moreover, and crucial, while the estimated covariance 
matrix of the tax gap estimation needs to be adjusted to account for the variability in the trade 
integration variable when evaluating specific hypothesis tests, it still allows correct inference 
on whether the coefficient estimate of the generated regressor significantly differs from 0. 
Hence, it allows consistent significance tests, which is our prime interest here (for details, see 
Pagan, 1984; for a similar approach, see Head and Mayer, 2006). 
 
3.3.    Empirical results 
Our key results are summarized in Table 1. Column (1) presents baseline results when 
using the OLS estimator. In Column (2), we present the results from an IV estimation where 
we account for the potential endogeneity of GDP (using the difference in country-pairs’ 
public consumption, share of elderly and political leaning of the government as instruments; 
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their validity for this purpose is confirmed in the bottom row or Table 1). Finally, in Column 
(3), we operationalise the market size divergence between countries using the difference in 
their GDP (controlling for its endogeneity), rather than population size. Throughout the 
analysis, we rely on Newey-West heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors and cluster 
standard errors by country-years to account for the non-independence of observations (i.e., the 
fact that a change in the corporate tax rate in country i in year t not only affects country-pair 
ij, but also all other country-pairs including i). Such clustering is feasible as we have a large 
number of clusters (450) with relatively few observations (25 or less) in each cluster 
(Wooldridge, 2003).23 
 
--- Table 1 about here --- 
 
We find that the difference in population size has a positive and highly statistically 
significant impact on the difference in effective average tax rates between countries when 
trade integration is absent (i.e., φijt = 0). Hence, in line with predictions from standard 
asymmetric tax competition models without trade (Wilson, 1991; Bucovetsky, 1991), a bigger 
country can – and does – set a higher corporate income tax rate. 
Including the impact of trade integration on the relation between population differences 
and the tax gap, we see in Column (1) that, as expected, increasing trade integration 
significantly reduces the impact of the population differential on the tax gap. The exact 
relation is depicted in Figure 2 (left panel). Even though the population differential retains a 
statistically significant effect at conventional levels throughout the range taken by the trade 
23 Note that each country-pair is simultaneously part of two clusters (i.e., one for the origin-country in year t and 
one for the destination-country in year t), creating a complicated correlation structure. As these two sets of 
clusters are by construction highly correlated and partially overlapping, clustering standard errors 
simultaneously in both dimensions is impossible. It also invalidates recently developed procedures accounting 
for multi-way clustering (e.g., Cameron et al., 2011), as these are only valid for non-nested and non-
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integration variable, the strength of this effect is decreasing in trade integration. This finding 
confirms part b) of OvY theoretical prediction, and illustrates the empirical relevance of the 
models of capital tax competition based on New Economic Geography frameworks. It 
suggests that tax disparities across countries can indeed be partly explained by the fact that 
some countries are exposed to tax competition to a different degree than others. 
 
--- Figure 2 about here --- 
 
Interestingly, Column (1) also indicates that trade liberalization has no direct impact on 
the tax gap when both countries are of equal size (i.e., when 0=Ω ), which is in line with 
theoretical predictions for interior equilibria (see eq. 1). However, calculating the effect of 
trade integration over the range of the population differential, we find that it significantly 
affects the tax differential whenever the population differential exceeds roughly 100 million 
inhabitants (which occurs in about 15% of our sample, with country-combinations including 
the US, Japan or Mexico). The exact relation is depicted in Figure 2 (middle panel). When the 
population differential is ‘large enough’, the effect of trade integration is to decrease the tax 
rate of the larger country relative to that of the smaller one. This provides support for the 
theoretical prediction that, for interior equilibria, the overall effect of trade integration on the 
bilateral tax differential is negative (from the perspective of the bigger country).  
In order to quantify this effect, we carry out a counter-factual analysis. Specifically, we 
compare the average EATR gap predicted by our model between big and small countries at 
the level of trade liberalization observed in 2004 and under the assumption that the level of 
trade liberalization had been frozen at the level of 1982 (i.e. the counterfactual). This indicates 
that if bilateral trade liberalization had been frozen at its 1982 levels, the average EATR gap 
overlapping clusters. To alleviate this problem, we ran all regressions using either origin-year or destination-
year clustering and report the most conservative estimates obtained (i.e., origin-year clustering). 
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between big and small countries in our sample in 2004 would have been 3.879%.  In contrast, 
with the levels of trade liberalization observed in 2004, this average EATR gap between big 
and small countries is 3.626%. Increased trade integration between 1982 and 2004 therefore 
seems to have reduced the average corporate income tax differential between big and small 
countries with 0.253% (or 6.98% of the currently observed difference).24 
While Column (2) indicates that the results presented in Column (1) are not affected by 
the potential endogeneity of GDP, Column (3) shows that our results are robust to using the 
difference in GDP as a measure of market-size divergence. In particular, we find a significant 
positive baseline effect of the GDP-gap (i.e., when φijt = 0), which declines for higher levels 
of trade integration. While this interaction effect is statistically fairly weak (p=0.175), it is 
sufficiently powerful to make the positive effect of the GDP-gap lose statistical significance at 
about φijt = 0.013 (a value well above the mean, suggesting that the GDP-gap positively 
affects the corporate tax gap in the majority of our sample).  The graphical representation in 
Figure 2 (right panel) is highly reminiscent of that generated when using population size to 
measure market size divergence (Figure 2, left panel). 
Turning briefly to our control variables, we find that the sign of the unemployment 
difference is at odds with the idea that higher unemployment is costly in terms of 
unemployment benefits (leading to higher tax rates). Rather, it suggests that governments use 
corporate tax cuts as a device to reduce unemployment by attracting new firms (Haufler and 
24  Comparing the absolute magnitude of this 6.98% difference with other findings in the literature is not 
straightforward since studies addressing how trade integration affects tax competition and corporate income 
tax rates do not generally differentiate between its effect on large and small countries (e.g. Swank and 
Steinmo, 2002; Winner, 2005; Devereux et al., 2008; Rincke and Overesch, 2011). Genschel and Schwartz 
(2011, 356) provide the only partial exception. They argue that the positive correlation between corporate 
income tax rates and country size (which indicates that small countries set lower rates than large countries) 
“increased significantly in the 1990s and 2000s suggesting that tax competition gained in strength”. Still, 
their exclusive focus on correlation coefficients makes it impossible to estimate the effect trade integration 
had on the corporate income tax differential between big and small countries. 
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Mittermaier, 2011; Exbrayat et al., 2012).25 The difference in the share of young individuals 
across countries is associated with a significantly reduced corporate tax gap, while the 
difference in share of elderly has no effect. The same insignificance is observed for 
differences in governments’ political leaning and consumption levels. The expected impact of 
EU membership on tax differentials is not obvious. One might think that deeper economic 
integration should ease capital mobility, intensify tax competition and result in lower tax 
differentials. We obtain the opposite result. EU membership of one or both countries is linked 
to a higher corporate income tax gap, suggesting that corporate tax rates show higher variation 
within the EU than between other OECD countries.26 This might be explained by the fact that 
tax competition in the EU mostly occurs among the sub-group of Western – high tax – 
countries rather than between Western and Eastern – low tax – countries (see Cassette and 
Paty, 2008, for empirical evidence on such behavior). Finally, capital mobility (captured by an 
inverse measure of the level of international capital controls) exerts the expected negative 
impact on corporate tax differentials.  
 
3.4   Robustness analyses 
3.4.1. Persistence and alternative corporate tax measures 
Since the tax gap between countries – just like the tax rates of individual countries – 
shows significant persistence over time, we evaluate whether this persistence affects our core 
findings by including a lagged dependent variable (even though no clear argument in favour 
of such inclusion flows from the theoretical model). Although panel-data estimators are well-
known to generate biased and inconsistent results in the presence of a lagged dependent 
25  One might argue that unemployment could be endogenous, as a tax advantage in a country attracts firms and 
could therefore, in fine, reduce the unemployment differential. Still, using the lagged value of unemployment 
to (partially) accommodate this issue does not affect our results. 
26  One could argue that including variables for the EMU leads to overspecification of the model, in that such 
variables will, by definition, be highly correlated with a shift in trade integration between the countries 
involved. Still, excluding these variables does not affect our main findings (details upon request). 
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variable, the length of our time series (over 20 years) implies that any such bias is likely to be 
small (Nickell, 1981). Nonetheless, we cautiously instrument the lagged dependent variable 
with two further lags.27  The results are given in Columns (4), (6) and (8) of Table 2. They 
indicate that there is substantial persistence in tax differentials, but, crucially, this does not 
affect our core findings. Trade integration consistently mitigates the link between market size 
differences and corporate income tax differences. 
In the remaining columns of Table (2), we furthermore illustrate that this same 
conclusion holds for alternative operationalisations of the tax measure. Although the 
theoretical model is predicated on greenfield investments (see above), Columns (5) through 
(8) evaluate the empirical model’s robustness to statutory tax rates and Effective Marginal 
Tax Rates (EMTR). A priori, one would expect weaker effects when using EMTR-differences 
between country-pairs as the dependent variable. The reason is that this measure of taxation is 
relevant for marginal rather than discrete investment decisions. For differences in statutory tax 
rates between countries (Stattax), however, one could expect similar if not stronger results 
than those for EATR. Statutory tax rates are the most directly observable measure of 
corporate taxation, and can thus more easily be compared from one country to another. The 
results in Table 2 confirm the above intuitions. 
 
--- Table 2 about here --- 
 
3.4.2 Non-linear trade cost effects? 
As a corollary to the analysis of the Nash tax gap in OvY model, it is interesting to point 
out that trade costs have a non-linear effect on the tax gap between countries as soon as there 
is a positive population gap. Specifically, tax disparities can be shown to exhibit a concave 
27 This follows the approach taken in Devereux et al. (2008). The validity of these instruments is confirmed by a 
standard Hansen test in all regressions (except for the statutory tax as dependent variable, see Table 2).  
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relation with trade costs ( 0/ 22 <∆∗ τdd ). This holds both for the interior equilibrium and the 
core-periphery equilibrium – with the sole difference that the relationship between the tax gap 
and trade costs is not strictly increasing (but rather hump-shaped with a maximum value 
at 2/MCPττ = ) in the latter case (Figure 3). 
 
--- Figure 3 about here --- 
 
To illustrate this more formally, note that equations (1) and (2) can also be rewritten as, 
respectively: 
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This corollary can be evaluated via a slightly extended version of our empirical model: 
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The results are given in Table 3. Clearly, given the presence of the interaction terms 
between trade integration and the population differential, the results on φ and φ² cannot be 
directly interpreted as marginal effects. Nonetheless, it can be observed that in both the static 
and dynamic model the prediction that tax disparities are a concave function of trade costs is 
rejected. To the limited extent that such non-linearity exists in the data, it points in the 
opposite direction (this finding persists when dropping the interaction terms; available upon 
request). One potential explanation is that the large majority of our sample concerns highly 
developed countries with relatively high levels of trade integration. Consequently, variation in 
integration in our sample might well be too limited to pick up these finer distinctions. 
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 --- Table 3 about here --- 
 
3.4.3 Third country effects with asymmetric trade costs 
A three-country extension of OvY model (where the third country is interpreted as the 
rest of the world) illustrates that, when all country-pairs share the same level of trade 
integration, the theoretical prediction expressed in our main Hypothesis still holds regarding 
the most realistic case of interior equilibria (see Exbrayat, 2013). While the analytical 
expressions become quite complex in a theoretical model allowing for variation in trade 
integration across country-pairs, it seems reasonable to lift this restriction in the empirical 
analysis. This, however, is not innocuous with respect to the empirical specification. Clearly, 
symmetric levels of trade integration between three countries (denoted 1, 2 and 3) imply that 
country 1 and 2 enjoy the same access to country 3. This makes that the relative attractiveness 
of country 1 with respect to country 2 – which drives their difference in tax base elasticity and 
the tax gap between them – is unaffected by both countries’ relation to country 3. As serving 
the market in country 3 is just as easy from country 1 than 2, this plays no role in the tax-
setting process. Allowing for asymmetric trade integration, this is no longer true and the 
attractiveness of country 1 relative to country 2 will now also depend on both countries’ 
relative size and integration with country 3. The reason is that this reflects how profitable it is 
to serve the third country from country 1 as compared to country 2. Consequently, the 
bilateral tax gap (i.e., between country 1 and 2) will then also depend on the population 
differentials and bilateral levels of trade integration with respect to the third country. This 
implies extending the empirical model in the following way when accounting for third 
country effects with asymmetric trade costs: 
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where we expect positive signs for β5 and β9, negative ones for β6 and β8 and signs as before 
for β4 and β7. The intuition is the following: i) PopGapikt exerts a positive influence on the 
absolute level of taxation in country i (and, ceteris paribus, also on TaxGapijt) while PopGapjkt 
exerts a positive influence on the absolute level of taxation in country j (and, ceteris paribus, a 
negative influence on TaxGapijt) and ii) both relationships are attenuated by trade integration.  
Unfortunately, we cannot estimate this regression directly because of a severe collinearity 
problem. Indeed, when the difference in population between countries i and j increases, it 
mechanically increases (decreases) the population gap between country i (j) and the rest of the 
world. To overcome this problem, we redefine the third-country part of the model in terms of 
the population of country i relative to the total population in the 26 OECD countries in our 
sample. The resulting variable – RelPopikt – is independent of PopGapijt, and the difference in 
population between country j and k is (weakly) negatively correlated with ijtPopGap  so that a 
change in PopGapjkt  is incorporated in our empirical model through ijtPopGap  and RelPopikt. 
Hence, we estimate the following regression, where Openit denotes the overall trade openness 
of country i: 
( )
( ) ijttjiijtitikt
iktitijtijtijtijtijt
DOYOpenelPopR
elPopROpenPopGapPopGapTaxGap
εηββ
ββϕββϕβ
+++++×+
++×++=
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54321
 
Results are reported in Table 4. First, we can observe that controlling for third country effects 
in this way does not affect our main results. The coefficient estimates are also very similar, 
suggesting that subsuming third-country effects into our fixed effects did not generate 
significant bias in our inferences. Second, the results provide evidence for the existence of 
significant third-country effects. As expected, the relative size of a country with respect to the 
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rest of the world has a positive impact on its tax difference with country j, and this 
relationship is significantly weakened by its trade openness to the world.  
 
--- Table 4 about here --- 
 
3.4.4. Income effects 
     One central simplification of the theoretical model is that it abstracts from income effects 
by assuming quasi-linear preferences. To overcome this, we can introduce a more general 
measure for countries’ market potential. Specifically, we rely on the real market potential 
variable provided by the CEPII, which has several advantages.28 First, it is estimated from a 
theory-grounded gravity equation, which implies that trade liberalisation is estimated rather 
than approximated by, say, the inverse of distance (see section 3.3). Second, it takes into 
account that the market potential of a country is not only increasing with demand coming 
from other countries but also decreasing with the average price in those countries. Finally, it is 
estimated using a dataset covering more than 150 countries, thus allowing us to indirectly take 
into account third-country effects. 
        Using this real market potential variable, we estimate the following regression: 
ijttjiijtijtijtijt DOYRmpGapTaxGap εηββϕβ ++++++= 321  
where RmpGapijt denotes the difference in the real market potential of countries i and j.29 We 
expect β2 to be positive, since, all else equal, an increase in the real market potential in 
country i means this country becomes more profitable for firms and thus can attract more 
28  The matching of production levels and trade flows by the CEPII allows construction of internal flows (i.e. 
production minus exports) and thus the estimation of border effects. We use the real market potential 
predicted according to the methodology of Redding and Venables (2004), which ignores border effects. 
Nevertheless, in a robustness check, we include the real market potential predicted according to the Head and 
Mayer (2004) methodology, which takes into account those border effects. The bilateral difference in this 
alternative measure of real market potential also exerts a positive and significant impact on tax differentials 
(available upon request). For more information on this dataset, see 
http://www.cepii.fr/anglaisgraph/bdd/marketpotentials.htm. 
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capital, allowing its government to raise taxation. As this market potential measure inherently 
accounts for trade integration effects (see section 3.3), no interaction with trade integration is 
feasible here. 
 
--- Table 5 about here --- 
 
 The results reported in Table 5 – Columns (17) and (18) – confirm that the difference 
in market potential has a significant positive impact on the tax gap. This complements the 
results provided in Davies and Voget (2008), which show that a countries’ market potential 
has a positive impact on absolute levels of corporate taxation. To take the analysis one step 
further, Columns (19) and (20) present results when the market potential differential is 
decomposed into the difference in domestic and foreign market potential. This allows 
evaluating whether the difference in domestic market potential rather than foreign market 
potential matters most for governments.30 The results illustrate that both elements have a 
significant positive impact on the tax difference. Clearly, however, given the scale of both 
variables, the difference in domestic market potential exerts a stronger impact. This is not 
surprising, as a firm’s mark-up is higher for domestic sales than for foreign ones because of 
trade costs. 
 
4.    Concluding discussion 
This paper contributes to the literature on international corporate income tax competition by 
analysing the determinants of international tax disparities – focusing on the potential role of 
trade integration. We thereby provide, to the best of our knowledge, the first empirical test of 
two key predictions of the New Economic Geography (NEG) approach to tax competition: a) 
29  We exclude PopGapijt from this model as it is highly correlated with RmpGapijt (r=0.65; p<0.01). 
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tax differentials are a function of the coexistence of imperfect trade integration and 
asymmetric market sizes and b) increased trade integration reduces the ability of large 
countries to set higher taxes.  
Our results – based on a panel dataset of 26 OECD countries over the period 1982-
2004 – support both these theoretical predictions. That is, market size asymmetries between 
two countries increase the tax gap between them, ceteris paribus, and this relationship is 
weakened by trade liberalization. These findings are robust to different measures of market 
size (i.e. population or GDP) and corporate taxation (i.e. statutory tax rates, EATR and 
EMTR), and the inclusion of third-country and income effects. They provide one potential 
explanation for the considerably decline in tax disparities between OECD countries since the 
early 1980s (see Figure 1). Moreover, from a policy perspective, our evidence substantiates 
the US Treasury’s fear that globalization is eroding the US’ ability to sustain higher tax rates 
compared to other countries (see introduction). It also supports Ottaviano and van Ypersele’s 
(2005, 45) contention that “the policy attitude towards tax competition should depend on the 
degree of trade integration”. Analyzing distortions in the spatial distribution of firms induced 
by tax competition, they conclude that trade integration reduces the (positive) tax gap between 
the big and the small country that would be necessary to achieve the (second-best) optimum.31 
Therefore, from a welfare perspective, the effect of trade liberalization on tax convergence 
when governments behave non-cooperatively might not be strong enough to attenuate tax 
distortions with respect to the spatial distribution of firms. 
Even so, various questions remain. One concerns the so-called ‘home market effect’: 
i.e., the fact that the country with a larger demand for the increasing returns industry attracts 
30 We approximate domestic market potential by the difference between (predicted) total market potential and 
(predicted) foreign market potential. 
31  The second-best allocation is the spatial distribution of firms that the social planner would choose if he was 
able to assign any number of modern firms to a specific region, but unable to use lump-sum transfers from 
workers to firms to implement marginal cost pricing. Focusing on the most realistic case of interior location 
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an even larger share of production. While earlier work gives somewhat mixed evidence on the 
existence of a home market effect in general (e.g., Davis and Weinstein, 2003; Crozet and 
Trionfetti, 2008; Behrens et al., 2009), another way to empirically address NEG models’ 
predictions would be to separate between low-tax and high-tax countries in such studies. 
Technically, the prediction is that high-tax countries remain net importers of capital, as their 
attractiveness should overcompensate their higher tax-setting in equilibrium (see section 2.). 
Another question is to what extent higher taxes set by some countries truly results from their 
attractiveness with respect to mobile firms or from the fact that they host an industrial cluster 
(which induces firms’ immobility and allows governments to tax them more severely). In the 
latter case, the higher corporate tax rate would not result from asymmetric tax competition 
with an interior location equilibrium, but from rent-seeking behaviour towards immobile 
firms. One possibility to address this in future work might be to move the analysis from the 
country to the sectoral level, thereby exploiting the variation in the extent of industrial 
clustering across sectors (cf. Brülhart et al., 2012).  Finally, it would be interesting to extend 
the theoretical model by allowing not only for different market sizes but also different 
production costs to test whether or not trade integration reduces the comparative advantage of 
the low-cost country. 
equilibria, the second-best optimum is characterized by a stronger home-market effect than when 
governments behave non-cooperatively.  
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Table 1: Estimation results for the baseline regression (1982-2004) 
Variable (1) EATR 
(2) 
EATR 
(3) 
EATR 
Intercept 0.404*** 
(9.82) 
0.413*** 
(10.24) 
0.316*** 
(5.67) 
φ  -0.135 
(-0.82) 
-0164 
(-0.99) 
0.179 
(0.51) 
PopGap 1.279*** 
(7.30) 
1.354*** 
(7.58) 
0.894*** 
(3.65) 
PopGap * φ -5.202** 
(-2.40) 
-5.350** 
(-2.51) 
- 
RealGDPGap 3.160*** 
(3.73) 
2.640* 
(1.87) 
5.753 *** 
(3.53) 
RealGDPGap * φ - - -186.736 
(-1.36) 
PconsGap -0.002 
(-1.18) 
- 
 
- 
UnempGap -0.005*** 
(-8.52) 
-0.005*** 
(-7.40) 
-0.005*** 
(-7.07) 
OldGap -0.001 
(-0.09) 
- - 
YouGap -0.011*** 
(-10.13) 
-0.011*** 
(-12.43) 
-0.010*** 
(-9.89) 
UrbGap -0.004*** 
(-5.14) 
-0.005*** 
(-5.37) 
-0.004*** 
(-5.01) 
LeftGap -0.0004 
(-0.34) 
- 
 
- 
OpenGap -0.001*** 
(-3.84) 
-0.001*** 
(-3.03) 
-0.001*** 
(-3.60) 
CapMobGap -0.006*** 
(-6.50) 
-0.006*** 
(-6.47) 
-0.006*** 
(-5.98) 
EMUsingle 
 
EMUboth 
 
0.016*** 
(2.77) 
0.013** 
(2.18) 
0.016*** 
(2.78) 
0.013** 
(2.14) 
0.018*** 
(2.94) 
0.012** 
(2.03) 
Country dummies (O & D) 
Year dummies 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
N 
R² (overall) 
Anderson Canonical 
Hansen 
4730 
0.792 
- 
- 
4730 
0.791 
517.03*** 
2.356 
4730 
0.777 
96.683*** 
3.312 
Note: Dependent variable: EATRGap; t-statistics based on heteroscedasticity-consistent standard 
errors and clustered by origin-country-year in parenthesis: *** significant at 1%, ** at 5% 
and * at 10%. Anderson Canonical correlation statistic tests for weak identifying restrictions, 
while Hansen is the test for over-identifying restrictions 
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Table 2: Results alternative tax measures and lagged dependent variable (1982-2004) 
Variable (4) EATR 
(5) 
EMTR 
(6) 
EMTR 
(7) 
Stattax 
(8) 
Stattax 
Intercept 0.184*** 
(5.70) 
0.326*** 
(5.75) 
0.194*** 
(5.86) 
0.636*** 
(13.73) 
0.254*** 
(5.79) 
Lagged dependent variable 0.669*** 
(19.97) 
- 0.651*** 
(22.16) 
- 0.682*** 
(19.44) 
φ  0.102 
(1.37) 
-0.149 
(-0.67) 
0.133 
(1.40) 
-0.121 
(-0.65) 
0.045 
(0.50) 
PopGap 0.635*** 
(4.74) 
0.772*** 
(3.10) 
0.650*** 
(4.77) 
2.467*** 
(12.87) 
0.927*** 
(4.98) 
PopGap * φ -2.211* 
(-1.73) 
-6.421** 
(-2.37) 
-2.324 
(-1.49) 
-7.995** 
(-2.47) 
-3.825** 
(-2.22) 
N 
R² (overall) 
Anderson Canonical 
Hansen 
4103 
0.932 
738.46*** 
1.324 
4730 
0.693 
4103 
0.912 
582.49*** 
1.596 
4993 
0.825 
4439 
0.931 
970.48*** 
3.546* 
Note: t-statistics based on heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors and clustered by origin-country-year in 
parenthesis: *** significant at 1%, ** at 5% and * at 10%. Anderson Canonical correlation statistic tests for 
weak identifying restrictions, while Hansen is the test for over-identifying restrictions. Control variables as in 
Table 1 included in every regression. 
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Table 3: Estimation results for the extended regression (1982-2004) 
Variable (9) EATR  
(10) 
EATR  
Intercept 0.375*** 
(8.01) 
0.178*** 
(5.17) 
Lagged dependent variable - 
 
0.669*** 
(19.96) 
Φ -0.138 
(-0.39) 
0.401** 
(2.18) 
φ² 1.802 
(0.45) 
-5.144*** 
(-2.35) 
PopGap 1.158*** 
(5.94) 
0.614*** 
(4.30) 
PopGap * φ 5.551 
(1.02) 
-3.649 
(-1.16) 
PopGap * φ² -0.0002*** 
(-2.56) 
0.00004 
(0.84) 
N 
R² (overall) 
Anderson Canonical 
Hansen 
4730 
0.792 
4103 
0.932 
738.49*** 
1.409 
Note: Dependent variable: EATRGap; t-statistics based on heteroscedasticity-consistent 
standard errors and clustered by origin-country-year in parenthesis: *** significant 
at 1%, ** at 5% and * at 10%. Anderson Canonical correlation statistic tests for 
weak identifying restrictions, while Hansen is the test for over-identifying 
restrictions. Control variables as in Table 1 included in every regression. 
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Table 4: Controlling for third-country effects (1982-2004) 
Variable (11) EATR 
(12) 
EATR 
(13) 
EMTR 
(14) 
EMTR 
(15) 
Stattax 
(16) 
Stattax 
Intercept 13.008*** 
(6.24) 
3.194*** 
(3.24) 
19.385*** 
(6.01) 
3.803** 
(2.51) 
9.825*** 
(4.93) 
3.727*** 
(2.64) 
Lagged dependent 
variable 
- 0.656*** 
(19.15) 
- 0.638*** 
(21.57) 
- 0.675*** 
(18.77) 
Φ -0.229 
(-1.58) 
0.049 
(0.66) 
-0.287 
(-1.47) 
0.070 
(0.73) 
-0.231 
(-1.35) 
-0.005 
(-0.05) 
PopGap 1.360*** 
(8.21) 
0.698*** 
(4.96) 
0.879*** 
(3.86) 
0.715*** 
(5.00) 
2.597*** 
(13.81) 
0.986*** 
(4.95) 
PopGap * φ 
 
Openness 
 
RelPop 
 
RelPop * Openness 
 
-4.547** 
(-2.18) 
-0.001*** 
(-5.11) 
11.3*** 
(6.04) 
-0.010*** 
(-6.95) 
-2.042* 
(-1.64) 
-0.0002** 
(-2.19) 
2.57*** 
(2.66) 
-0.004*** 
(-3.03) 
-5.432** 
(-2.10) 
-0.0005*** 
(-2.96) 
17.1*** 
(5.90) 
-0.002*** 
(-7.28) 
-2.123 
(-1.39) 
-0.0001 
(-1.49) 
3.23** 
(2.38) 
-0.001*** 
(-3.20) 
-7.532** 
(-2.41) 
-0.002*** 
(-11.71) 
8.22*** 
(4.61) 
-0.001*** 
(-4.88) 
-3.623** 
(-2.16) 
-0.0002*** 
(-2.57) 
0.310** 
(2.48) 
-0.0004** 
(-2.40) 
N 
R² (overall) 
Anderson 
Hansen  
4730 
0.801 
4103 
0.933 
1195.79*** 
1.413 
4730 
0.708 
4103 
0.912 
963.11*** 
1.630 
4993 
0.829 
4439 
0.931 
1315.46*** 
3.521* 
Note: t-statistics based on heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors and clustered by origin-country-year in 
parenthesis: *** significant at 1%, ** at 5% and * at 10%. Anderson Canonical correlation statistic tests for 
weak identifying restrictions, while Hansen is the test for over-identifying restrictions. Control variables as in 
Table 1 included in every regression. 
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Table 5: Robustness checks: Introducing market potential (1982-2003) 
Variable (17) EATR 
(18) 
EATR 
(19) 
EATR 
(20) 
EATR 
Intercept 0.145*** 
(8.81) 
0.043*** 
(4.62) 
0.184*** 
(10.23) 
-0.012 
(-1.04) 
Lagged dependent 
variable 
- 0.643*** 
(18.22) 
- 0.624*** 
(16.09) 
Φ -0.244 
(-1.19) 
0.103 
(1.06) 
-0.226 
(-1.19) 
0.101 
(1.07) 
RmpGap 1.04*** 
(7.70) 
0.528*** 
(5.50) 
- - 
FRmpGap 
 
- - 0.043*** 
(8.80) 
0.092** 
(2.25) 
DRmpGap 
 
- - 0.0009*** 
(6.03) 
0.0005*** 
(5.30) 
N 
R² (overall) 
Anderson 
Hansen 
4477 
0.805 
3850 
0.934 
819.28*** 
1.389 
4477 
0.816 
3850 
0.934 
806.09*** 
1.062 
Note: t-statistics based on heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors and clustered by 
origin-country-year in parenthesis: *** significant at 1%, ** at 5% and * at 
10%. Anderson Canonical correlation statistic tests for weak identifying 
restrictions, while Hansen is the test for over-identifying restrictions. Control 
variables as in Table 1 included in every regression. 
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Figure 1: Corporate tax rate levels and convergence in OECD countries (1982-2011) 
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Figure 2: Graphical representation of interaction effects (baseline regressions) 
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Figure 3: Trade costs and the tax gap in OvY (2005) model 
 
 
 
 
 
 
τ  *cpτ  tradeτ  
2
M
cpτ
 
M
cpτ  0  
Core-periphery 
equilibrium 
with trade 
 
Interior 
equilibria 
with trade 
 
Autarky 
 
∆  
 39 
Appendix: Data sources and summary statistics 
EATRit : Effective Average Tax Rate (source: Loretz, 2008).   
EMTRit : Effective Marginal Tax Rate (source: Loretz, 2008).   
EATRit : Statutory Tax Rate (source: Loretz, 2008).   
φijt : Trade integration (own calculations using the CEPII-TradeProd and CEPII-Gravity databases; 
Head et al., 2010; de Sousa et al., 2012). 
Rmpit: Real market potential (source: CEPII-TradeProd and CEPII-Gravity databases) 
FRmpit: Foreign real market potential (source: CEPII-TradeProd and CEPII-Gravity databases) 
DRmpit: Domestic real market potential (source: CEPII-TradeProd and CEPII-Gravity databases) 
PCONSit : public consumption in percentage of GDP per capita (source: Penn World Tables). 
UNEMPit: standardized unemployment rate (source: OECD Social Expenditures database). 
RealGDPit: real GDP per capita (source: Penn World Tables). 
CapMobit: Index of Capital Mobility (source: Economic Freedom of the World database) 
POPit: population (in thousand) (source: Penn World Tables). 
OPENit: trade openness (source: Penn World Tables). 
LEFTit: Coded 1 if executive right-wing, 0 if centre and -1 if left-wing (source: World Bank: Database 
of Political Institutions). 
URBit: proportion of population living in urban areas (source: World Bank Development Indicators). 
OLDit: proportion of population over age 65 (source: World Bank Development Indicators). 
YOUit: proportion of population under age 14 (source: World Bank Development Indicators). 
EMUsingleit: dummy = 1 if only one country in a country-pair ij is member of EMU (or its 
predecessors). 
EMUbothit: dummy = 1 if both countries in a country-pair ij are member of EMU (or its predecessors). 
 
 
 
 
Summary statistics for variables in differences (1982-2004) 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
EATRGap 0.0018 0.1102 -0.4383 0.4218 
EMTRGap 0.0105 0.1626 -1.0753 1.2290 
StattaxGap -0.0029 0.1349 -0.5500 0.5171 
RmpGap 
FRmpGap 
DRmpGap 
PopGap 
-0.1920 
0.0012 
-0.1932 
-0.0204 
2.1459 
0.0055 
2.1451 
0.0794 
-10.3755 
0.0326 
-10.3759 
-0.2925 
7.4324 
0.0325 
7.4035 
0.1235 
OldGap 1.2489 4.7589 -13.9600 13.9800 
YouGap -2.3983 7.1670 -26.6500 25.1900 
UrbGap 2.7153 15.2734 -40.3000 45.4000 
RealGDPGap 0.0009 0.0069 -0.0279 0.0282 
CapMobGap 0.6981 3.5192 -10 10 
PconsGap -0.8217 6.1094 -26.0200 23.6700 
UnempGap 0.7896 5.6394 -20.500 21.6000 
LeftGap -0.1009 1.2760 -2 2 
OpenGap 2.4466 36.1473 -142.0114 163.8226 
Note: RealGDPGap in million; PopGap, RmpGap, FRmpGap and DrmpGap in 
billion (to make coefficient estimates more readable in Tables 1 through 6). 
 
 40 
Summary statistics for estimated trade integration variable (1982-2004) 
 
Φ Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Observations 
Overall 0.00233 0.00632 1.39e-07 0.10009 N =    8125 
1980s 0.00001 0.00003 1.39e-07 0.00073 N =    3250 
1990s 0.00158 0.00287 1.53e-06 0.03174 N =    3250 
2000s 0.00848 0.01156 0.00025 0.10009 N =    1625 
Between country-pairs  0.00294 0.00018 0.02043 n =     325 
Within country-pairs  0.00559 -0.01806 0.08199 T =      25 
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